In this paper, I first showed that an indirect information measure is supported by expected learning cost minimization if and only if it satisfies: 1. monotonicity in Blackwell order, 2. sub-additivity in compound experiment and 3. linearity in mixing with no information. Then I studied a dynamic information acquisition problem with flexible design of information dynamics, costly waiting and costly information. When flow information measure satisfies the three conditions, dynamic problem can be solved in two steps: solving a static rational inattention problem, and implementing optimal learning dynamics. Optimal solution involves stationary Poisson direct signals: arrival of signal directly suggests optimal action, and non-arrival of signal provides no information.
Introduction
Information plays a central role in economic activities. It affects both strategic interaction in games and single agent decision making under uncertainty. Information is often endogenously acquired by decision maker, as opposed to being exogenously endowed. Therefore, it is important to understand how information is acquired. This boils down to a simple trade-off: the value of information and the cost of acquiring information. Value of information is unambiguous in single agent decision problem with uncertainty. It is measured by the increased expected utility from choosing optimal actions measurable to informative signal realizations(see Blackwell et al. (1951) ). However, there has been less consensus on the proper form of information acquisition cost. One (probably most) popular measure of informativeness being used in studying information acquisition problem is Entropy based mutual information and its generalizations. This approached was initiated by Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 , and applied to a wide range of problems (Matejka and McKay (2014) , Steiner et al. (2017) , Yang (2015) , Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014), etc.) . Despite its great theoretical tractability, Entropy based model suffers from criticism on its unrealistic properties, including prior dependence, invariant likelihood ratio of action etc.
✩ This paper was previously circulated with title "Dynamic information acquisition with linear waiting cost". I thank Yeon-Koo Che, Mark Dean, Pietro Ortoleva, Philipp Strack and Michael Woordford for useful discussions.
Email address: wz2269@columiba.edu (Weijie Zhong) Two approaches can be taken to build a solid foundation for studying information acquisition. One approach is to fully characterize behavior implications associated with mutual information and its generalizations. Then we will be able to test behavior validity of these models. Caplin et al. (2017) took this approach and proposes testable axioms for Shannon model of rational inattention and its generalizations. The other approach is to impose only minimal assumption on cost of information and study robust predictions from an information acquisition problem. In this paper I take the second robust approach and focus on dynamic information acquisition problem: a decision maker acquires information about payoff relevant state before choosing an action. She can choose an arbitrary random process as observed information, subject to cost on information and cost on waiting.
I accomplish two main goals. First, I characterize "minimal assumption" on (static) information measure if decision maker can choose from not only all information structures but also all combinations of them. I show that an indirect information measure is supported by expected learning cost minimization-there is a totally general measure of information, and for any information structure (Blackwell experiment), we minimize expected total measure of compound experiment which replicates original information structure-if and only it satisfies three simple conditions. 1. Monotonicity: Blackwell more informative experiment has higher measure. 2. Sub-additivity: expected total measure of replicating compound experiment is higher than measure of original experiment. 3. C-linearity: mixing uninformative experiment with a proportion of informative experiment has measure proportional to measure of the informative part.
Second, I solve a dynamic information acquisition problem with those assumptions imposed on flow information measure. I show that solving the dynamic problem can be divided into two steps. The first step is to solve a static rational inattention problem for an optimal static information structure. The second step is to solve for optimal dynamic implementation of solution to first step. Optimal information process involves stationary Poisson direct signals: signal arrives as Poisson processes and suggests the optimal action directly. When no signal arrives, posterior belief process stays at prior.
Related Literature
My paper is closed related to two sets of works that aimed at understanding measure of information. The first tries to characterize implications (testable or non-testable) of commonly used information measures. Basic mathematical implications and characterizations for Entropy and Entropy based mutual information was provided in standard information theory text book like Cover and Thomas (2012) . Matejka and McKay (2014) and Dean (2013) studied behavior implications for rational inattention model based on Mutual information and posterior separable information measure respectively. Caplin and Dean (2015) studied implications for rational inattention model based on general information measure. A full behavior characterization for mutual information, posterior separable information cost and their generalizations is provided in Caplin et al. (2017) . Meanwhile, the second seeks to build dynamic foundation for common information measures. Morris and Strack (2017) showed that posterior sep-arable function can be represented as induced cost from random sampling. Hébert and Woodford (2016) justified a class of information cost function (including mutual information) based on a continuous-time sequential information acquisition problem. My paper contributes to this literature by providing a new optimization foundation for posterior separability. Posterior separability is actually equivalent to additivity in expected measure of compound experiments. I show that sub-additivity is justified by expected information cost minimization.
My paper is also closed related to the dynamic information acquisition literature, in which the main goal is to characterize the learning dynamics. A common approach in this literature is to model information flow as a simple family of random process. The decision maker can control parameters which represents aspects of interest. Wald (1947) first studies stopping problem with exogenous information process. Moscarini and Smith (2001) and Che and Mierendorff (2016) go further by edogenizing information process into optimization problem in Brownian motion framework and Poisson bandits framework to study dynamics of learning intensity and direction respectively. Some recent papers edogenize the random process family as well and give decision maker full flexibility in designing information. Zhong (2017) studies flexible dynamic information acquisition with a posterior separable information measure and shows that confirmatory Poisson signal is optimal. Steiner et al. (2017) studies a repeated rational inattention problem with mutual information as cost. My paper contributes by relaxing the restriction on information cost to only minimal assumptions. I show that when impatience is measure by fixed cost, dynamic problem is closely related to static rational inattention problem, and Poisson signals will be robustly optimal.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces characterization of indirect information measure based on expected cost minimization. Section 3 setups a dynamic information acquisition problem and provides solution.
Indirect information measure

Information structure and measure of informativeness
In this subsection, I make a formal definition for "information" in decision making problems and a measure of informativeness. I extract key factors in any abstract "information" that matters in a decision making problem and characterized a well defined equivalence class that characterizes all information structures. On the other hand, I use an "indirect information measure" characterization to derive minimal assumptions we should impose on an information measure. We'd like to study the "set" of all information structures as a choice set for decision maker. However, since S is an arbitrary set, the "set" of all possible S is not even a well-defined object from the perspective of set theory. Instead, we are going to use Πpµq to equivalently characterize the "set" of all information structures. @ pS, pq, @s P S, we can calculate the posterior belief from observing s according to Bayes rule. The distribution of all such posterior will form a Bayesian plausible distribution as define in Definition 1. Since different signals inducing same posterior belief affect neither choice of action nor expected utility, we claim that Πpµq already summarizes all possible information structures (up to inducing same posteriors). Γ is defined as the set of all pairs pπ, µq where π represents an information structure at µ.
Definition 2 (Information measure).
An information measure is a mapping I : Γ Ñ R`. Ipπ, µq can be equivalently represented by I pS; X |µq where µ is distribution of X and S induces belief distribution π.
Information measure I is defined as a mapping from prior-information structure pairs in Γ to extended non-negative real numbers. The only restriction I put on I is that different information structures that induce same distribution of posterior π at µ will have same measure. This restriction is actually without loss of generality because a DM only cares about induced distribution of posterior of an information structure. Suppose different information structures have different measure, the DM is always able to choose an appropriate information structure with lowest information measure. 1 Definition 2 is same as information cost function defined in Caplin and Dean (2015) . The only difference is that I explicitly modeled prior dependence of I: µ is an argument in I as opposed to in Caplin and Dean (2015) prior is chosen and fixed in the beginning so there is no need to explicitly specify information cost function for different priors.
From this point on, for simplicity I will represent the choice set of DM as information structures S. However, I don't differentiate two information structures that induces same distribution of posterior beliefs. By using notation¨ˇˇS, I mean conditional on posterior beliefs induced by realization of S. Next step is to impose some restrictive assumptions on I. The restriction I impose is about comparing measure of information structure when they satisfies some information order. So first let's formally define the information order. 
Definition 3 (Information processing constraint
Definition 3 represents a most natural constraint in information acquisition problem: the causality constraint (I will also call this information processing constraint). When we make any choice T based on information S, the choice should be purely a result of information. Therefore, conditional on knowing the information, choice should not contain any more dependence with underlying state. This will be the key constraint I'm going to impose in Section 3. Proposition 1 comes mostly from Blackwell et al. (1951) and links information processing constraint to other well-known notions in probability theory and information theory. In fact, it defines a partial order on informativeness of information structures. It's intuitive that these notions are equivalent. They essentially all characterizes the fact that S carries more information about X than T . From this point on, I will use the four equivalent notions in an inter-changeable way. 
I pS λ ; X |µq " λI pS; S|µq Assumption 1 imposes three properties on information measure I. Monotonicity says that if an information structure S is Blackwell more informative than (statistically sufficient for) information structure T , then S should have measure no lower than T . Sub-additivity says when we break a combined information structure into two components, one conditional on the other, then the measure of the combined information structure should be no higher than the expected total measure of two components. C-linearity is a strengthen of sub-additivity in a special case: when a combined information structure can be decomposed into pure randomness and another information structure, then its cost should be expected cost of its components.
With Assumption 1, my model still nests some standard models concerning information acquisition. Monotonicity directly states that my information measure is consistent with Blackwell order of information (Blackwell et al. (1951) ). My model includes rational inattention models that uses mutual information as information measure ( Sims (2003) , Matejka and McKay (2014) etc. ) Mutual information is a special case where my sub-additivity assumption is replaced with additivity and a logarithm structure is imposed on information measure. In Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) and Zhong (2017) , a posterior separable information measure, which is more general than mutual information is used to model cost of information. Posterior separability is a special case of additivity (see discussion in Zhong (2017)), thus a special case of subadditivity. Generally speaking, Assumption 1 nests most information measures used in recent "information design" literature, where information is modeled in a nonparametric way. However, it still excludes many interesting settings. For example, it's hard to verify whether Assumption 1 is satisfied in a parametric model. It also fails prior independence (see Hébert and Woodford (2016) ), which is a very natural assumption when we think of information as objective experimentations.
Information cost minimization
To illustrate how restrictive Assumption 1 truly is, I'm going to show that it losses little generality in the sense that it characterizes a indirect information measure if one is able to choose combination of information structures in a flexible way to minimize expected total measure required to construct a desired information structure.
Proposition 2. Information measure I˚pS; X | q satisfies Assumption 1 iff there exists information measure I pS; X |µq s.t. @µ, S:
Proposition 2 states that when all possible information structures are available to an expected information measure minimizer, for any information structure, she will choose a way to re-construct it such that expected total information measure is minimized. Then the effective measure for a piece of information will satisfy Assumption 1. The intuition for Proposition 2 is quite simple. Consider expected information measure as a cost for information. If a Blackwell less informative information structure has higher measure, then it will never been chosen because by choosing the more informative structure, a DM can still accomplish any goal feasible with the less informative structure and pays a lower cost. This implies both monotonicity and sub-additivity. C-linearity is a special case of sub-additivity when adding irrelevant noise to information. On one hand, combining noise with information structure S, one can create S λ . On the other hand, combining S λ and S 1´λ one can create S. So additivity from both direction implies C-linearity.
There are many scenarios under which effective information measure is determined by minimization of expected measure. If we consider information as a product provided in a competitive market, then the minimization problem in Proposition 2 is very natural. The price of information will be marginal cost of information. And cost minimization on sellers' side implies price of information satisfying Assumption 1. ( In a monopolistic market there will be positive markups and varying information rents so pricing might be very different, see Zhong (2016) . ) Modern computer programs are designed to balance work loads from independent processes onto nodes/threads. As a result what matters is its average bandwidth, (as opposed to peak bandwidth or other measures). If we consider information as data processed by a computer, then in each CPU tick time, an optimally designed algorithm will minimize expected bandwidth required to process information.
Dynamic decision problem
Model
Assume that a decision maker(DM) faces the following decision problem:
• Decision problem: Time horizon t " 0, 1, . . . , 8 is discrete. Length of each time interval is dt. Utility associated with action-state pair pa, xq is upa, xq. DM pays a linear cost m of waiting. If the DM take action a P A at time t conditional on state being x P X, then her utility gain is upa, xq´mt. I assume utility gain to be totally bounded: sup a,x u pa, xq ă 8.
• Uncertainty: Not knowing the true state, DM forms a belief µ P ∆X about the state.
Her preference under uncertainty is expressed as von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility. I am going to use two essentially equivalent formulations to express expected utility. 1) Given belief µ, the expected utility associated with each action a P A is E µ rupa, xqs. 2) State and action are represented by random variables X , A. Expected utility is denoted by ErupA, X qs.
• Information Cost: Given information measure in Definition 2, we define a time separable information cost structure. In each period, with prior belief µ, DM pays information cost f pI pS, X |µqq which transforms informativeness of information structure acquired in the period into utility loss. f : R`Þ Ñ R`is a non-decreasing convex function which maps to extended real values.
• Dynamic Optimization: The dynamic optimization problem of the DM is:
where T P ∆N, t P N. S´1 is defined as an uninformative variable that induces belief same as prior belief µ of the DM (just for notation simplicity). S t´1 is defined as summary of past information`S 1 , . . . , S t´1˘. The DM chooses action time T , choices of action conditional on action time A t and signals S t subject to information cost, waiting cost and two natural constraints for information processing:
1. Information received in last period is sufficient for stopping in current period. 2. Information received in last period is sufficient for action in current period. 2 In Equation (P), the DM is modeled as choosing information flow S t , decision time T and choice of action A t simultaneously, to maximize utility gain from action profile net waiting cost and total information cost. Within each period, informativeness is measured by I and incurs cost f pIq. Across period, information costs are aggregated by expected sum of f . Since information measure is defined on information structureprior pairs. It's important to define clearly how prior is determined. In each period, information measure is evaluated conditional on realization of past signals and choice of stopping. This is a natural setup since past information plus whether action is taken in current period is exactly what the DM "knows" in current period. Therefore this is the finest filter on which she evaluates information cost. I will illustrate the cost structures of dynamic information acquisition with a simple two period model: t P t0, 1u and DM has prior belief µ. Timing is as following: when t " 0, DM first chooses whether to take an action and which action to take. Second she decides what information to acquire. when t " 1, DM takes action based on information acquired in period 0. First let's consider deterministic continuation decision. In period 0 no information has been acquired yet so if DM want to make a choice, her expected utility will be calculated with prior µ: E µ rupa, X qs and there is no waiting or information cost. If DM wants to collect information before decision making, she can acquire information structure S, now it's for sure T " 1 and X Ñ S Ñ A. Therefore she gets expected utility E rupA, X qs, pays waiting cost m and information cost f pIpS; X |µqq.
The problem becomes less trivial when continuation is random: suppose DM chooses to continue with probability p (independent to states because she has no information yet about state). Only conditional on continuation, she acquires S. Within my framework, total cost is p¨f pIpS; X , µqq`p1´pq¨0 by calculating conditional cost on 1 T ď0 . One might think that just conditional on information but not continuation decision, the same information structure is essentially S p and cost is f`I`S p ; X |µ˘˘. However, this is saying that when DM is choosing information after decision making in period 0, she acquires a signal correlated to her previous choice of continuation. This piece of randomness (whether to continue) is already resolved. Since our DM can not revert time, this case is physically impossible.
Solution
In this section, I will solve the dynamic information acquisition problem defined by Equation (P). First I characterize the optimal expected utility as solution to a simple static information acquisition problem. Second, I provide a simple stationary strategy that implements any static information and action strategy in Equation (P). Theorem 1. If I satiesfies Assumption 1, @µ P ∆X, suppose expected utility level Vpµq solves Equation (P), then:
The first superemum is taken over a, the second superemum is take over λ and A.
Theorem 1 establishes that solving the optimal utility level in Equation (P) is essentially a static problem with Assumption 1. In the static problem, DM pays a fixed marginal cost´m λ`f pλq λ¯o n each unit of information measure IpA; X |µq. Noticing that optimal parameter λ only depends on m, f when constraint IpA; X |µq ě λ doesn't bind. There is a more explicit algorithm to solve Equation (1):
Proposition 3. If I satisfies Assumption 1, Vpµq solves Equation (P) if and only if it solves the following problem:
Let λ˚" sup λ P R`ˇˇm`f pλq ą λ¨B f pλq ( and solve for
Proposition 3 states that value function in Equation (P) can be solved by solving three static problems. The first problem is a no-information benchmark where value equals expected utiltiy from choosing optimal action according to prior. The second problem is a standard rational inattention problem with marginal cost m λ˚`f pλ˚q λ˚o n information measure I. The interpretation is that under Assumption 1, dynamic informaiton acquisition problem is separable in two parts. First part is dynamic allocation of information, keeping total information fixed. Marginal cost of increasing total infomration is reflected by m λ˚`f pλ˚q λ˚, which measures impatience and smoothing incentive jointly. Second part is a static problem optimizing total information. The third problem is a special case when there is under-smoothing. This happens when waiting is so costly that it is optimal for decision maker to scale up information cost and wait for less than one period. Since fractional period length is not feasible, in this case decision maker solves a one-period problem.
Proposition 4. If I satisfies Assumption 1, @µ P ∆X, A P ∆AˆX and λ˚ă IpA; X |µq, let S t , A t , T˘be defined by 4 :
A with probability λI pA;X |µq if S t´1 " c 0 c 0 with probability 1´λI pA;X |µq if S t´1 " c 0 3.
Then:
Proposition 4 complements Theorem 1 by showing that the optimal value from Equation (1) can be implemented using simple stationary experimentation strategy feasible in Equation (P). Information structure S t explicitly codes three kinds of signals: Stop s 0 , Wait c 0 and Action in A. First condition defines initial information. Second condition defines information in following periods by induction: If S t´1 " s 0 or A it means action is already taken and information acquisition stops from now on so S t " s 0 and so on so forth. If S t´1 " c 0 it means do nothing and delay all decision to current period. Conditional on continuation, S t realizes as A with λI pA;X |µq probability. And in next period action will be taken according to realization of S t . With 1´λI pA;X |µq probability c 0 realizes and decision is delayed to next period. Third condition explicitly defines T : when action is taken in period t as indicated by S t´1 , then T " t. It's easy to verify information processing constraints in Equation (P). First, conditional on S t´1 , the distribution of 1 T ďt is degenerate. When S t´1 " c 0 it's 0 and 1 otherwise. So S Ñ S t´1 Ñ 1 T ď t. Second, conditional on S t´1 and knowing T " t, A t is also degenerate. It is exactly realization of S t´1 . Therefore X Ñ S t´1 Ñ A t .
Sketched proof.
Here I provide a simplified proof which illustrates the main intuition for Theorem 1 and Proposition 4. Since there is no discounting on utility gain, given an action process A T , deterministic factor for expected utility is 1) the combined distribution of all actions A. 2) the expected waiting time ErT s. How actions are allocated over time doesn't affect expectation of utility at all. Since actions are driven by information, this observation indicates that solving Equation (P) can be divide into three steps:
Step 1 is to solve for optimal distribution of information over time to minimize information cost given any combined information structure and waiting time.
Step 2 is to solve for optimal waiting time given any fixed combined information structure.
Step 3 is to solve for optimal combined information structure and associated action profile.
Step 1. Given any strategy`S t , A t , T˘, let's show that we can implement action distribution A T and expected waiting time ErT s with a better design of information. First, consider combining all information S "`S 1 , . . . , S t , . . .˘. By sub-additivity I pS; X |µq ď ř E " I`S t ; XˇˇS t´1˘‰ . Then we consider averaging IpS; X |µq into ErT s periods:
Second inequality is first by monotonicity of f then by convexity of f . That's to say: there is incentive to combined small information (by sub-additivity of I) and smooth information over time (by convexity of f ). Last inequality is from IpS; X |µq ď I pA; X |µq by Blackwell monotonicity of I. Then an ideal strategy is to spend f´I pA;X |µq ErT sō n information acquisition every period. Then let's implement the aforementioned information cost using a strategy defined as in Proposition 4. By C-linearity, acquiring A with probability 
t. T:´m´f`I T˘`I T f 1`I
T˘" 0. Replace λ " I T , we get the expression for λ: m`f pλq " λ f 1 pλq and further simplified problem:
The theorem deals with general case without smoothness assumption so f 1 is replaced with sub-differentials B f .
Step 3. I will refer to Wierestrass theorem to show existence of solution. See Proposition 5 for detailed discussion.
In the sketched proof I implictly assumed f to be differentiable, first order condition has solution and optimal T ě 1. The formal proof for general case is provided in Appendix B.1
Existence and uniqueness
In this section, I first show a general existence result for solution to Equations (2) and (3). Then I established its uniqueness in different dimensions. By toggling inequality in defining monotonicity of I, concavity of g and sub-additivity of I to strict inequality, my model will predict unique belief profile, unique information cost allocation and unique strategy correspondingly.
Proposition 5. If A, X are finite sets, I satisfies Assumption 1, then
• Existence: @ε ą 0, ∇ ε " tA|Pra|xs ě εu, then there exists a non-empty, convex and compact set of solution A ε to Equation (1) subject to A P ∇ ε .
• Uniqueness:
-If I satisfies strict-monotonicity, then posterior belief νpaq associated with any action a is unique for all optimal A.
-If f p¨q satisfies strict-convexity, then @ optimal strategy`S t , A t , T˘to Equation (P), I`S t ; X |S t´1 , 1 T ďt˘i s constant.
-If I satisfies strict-sub-additivity, then solution`S t , A t , T˘to Equation (P) is unique.
Proposition 5 establishes existence of solution to Equation (1) and uniqueness of different aspects under certain conditions. First, with Assumption 1, very mild extra assumptions (finite A and X) can guarantee existence of solution to Equation (1) (and solution to Equation (P) as well). Second, when strictly more informative information structure has strictly larger information measure, the belief inducing each action can be uniquely pinned down by optimization. Third, when information cost function f is strictly convex, then cost incurred in each experimentation period is constant over time. Finally, if combination of informative experiments has strictly larger measure than expected summation of components' measures, then whole dynamic strategy is uniquely pinned down.
The existence result is non-trivial in the sense that I don't impose any continuity assumption on I. However, I being an indirect information measure function actually guarantees it to be convex in an appropriate space. By Equation (1), strategy space is all random variable A. If we consider the space of all conditional distribution over A on X, then this is an Euclidean space and I will exactly be a convex function on this space: if S is a linear combination of S 1 and S 2 , then S can be implemented as randomly using S 1 or S 2 (and not knowing the choice of experiment). Therefore, monotonicity and sub-additivity guarantees S to have lower measure than linear combination of measures of S 1 , S 2 . Convexity of I implies both objective function to be continuous and choice set to be compact.
The incentive for inter-temporal smoothing of information is clearly illustrated in proof of Proposition 4 and Theorem 1: Convexity of information cost f implies incentive to smooth cost over time. Sub-additivity of I implies incentive to smooth choice of information structure over time. The incentive for choice of aggregate information structure is illustrated in proof of existence: monotonicity and sub-additivity implies a concave objective function. Now if any of aforementioned incentives is strict, then solution will be uniquely pinned down in corresponding dimension. First consider the proof for convexity of I in last part. Randomly using S 1 or S 2 (and know choice of experiment) will carry strictly more information than S (which discards information about which experiment is used). Therefore, strict monotonicity will imply objective function being strict concave (except when S 1 and S 2 have same row vectors). Second, consider step 1 in proof of Theorem 1. Suppose f is strictly convex, whenever information cost is not a constant over time, is will be strictly dominated by stationary strategy. Third, when there is strict sub-additivity, then any non-stationary experimentation strategy will be dominated by the stationary one I consructed. What's more, objective function in Equation (1) will be strictly concave w.r.t any A. In this case, the whole solution is uniquely pinned down. 
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B. Proof in Section 3
B.1. Proof for Theorem 1
Proof. Let Vpµq be expected utility in Equation (P). Then by assumption Vpµq ě 0. Suppose Vpµq " 0, then Theorem 1 is straight forward. Vpµq is achieved by choosing doing nothing and acquiring no information. From now on, we assume Vpµq ą 0. Pick any ε ă Vpµq, we want to show that there exists A, T s.t.:
Vpµq´ε ď E ru pA, X qs´mT´T fˆI pA; X | q TṠ uppose`S t , A t , T˘solves Equation (P) approches Vpµq up to ε 2 :
Lemma 1 ( Lemma 7 in Zhong (2017)) shows that we can assume the signal structure WLOG takes the following form:
Therefore, A t`1 ,1 T ďt and 1 T "t`1 are all explicitly signal realizations included in S t . We discuss two cases separately: Case 1. ErT s ě 1: Consider S T "`S 0 , S 1 ,¨¨¨, S T˘a s a combined information structure of all signals in first T periods. By sub-additivity in Assumption 1:
Now consider:
Choose T`1 ą mε max v 2 . Now combine Equations (B.1) and (B.2), and ř 8 t"0 ProbpT ą tq " E rT s, then we have:
s a random variable which summarizes realizations of all A t . Since A t`1 are directly included in S t , we have X Ñ S T Ñ A T`1 . Therefore, by Assumption 1:
That's to say, if we can implement A T`1 with expected waiting time ErT s and information cost ErT s f´I pA T`1 ;X |µq ErT s¯, then utility level will be weakly higher than V. We define the new strategy as follows:
1. In each period, acquire a combined information structure by mixing A T`1 with probability 1 ErT s and uninformative signal structure with probability 1´1 ErT s . 2. Following arrival of signal A T`1 , choosing the corresponding action. 3. If no informative signal arrive, do nothing and go to next period. It's not hard to see that in this strategy, action and signal are identical thus the three information processing constraint are naturally satisfied. In each period, the probabiltiy of decision making is 1 ErT s and the distribution of actions is A T`1 . Therefore, totally utility gain is:
Expected waiting time is:
Expected experimentation cost is:
ErT s˙t fˆI pA T`1 ; X |µq ErT s˙" ErT s fˆI pA T`1 ; X |µq ErT sṪ herefore, we find a strategy which is no worse than original strategy than ε 2 . Then:
E ru pA, X qs´mT´T fˆI pA; X | q TṪ herefore, we proved Theorem 1 when ErT s ě 1. Case 2. ErT s ă 1: Since T P N, ErT s ă 1 means PpT " 0q ą 0. When T " 0, no informatin is acquired yet and decision making is based on prior. Therefore:
First equality is from law of iterated expectation. Inequality is from when T " 0, choice of A 0 is not necessarily optimal. Suppose:
Then strategy pS t , A t , T q is dominated by acquiring no information and this already proves Theorem 1. Suppose on the other hand: 
We only need to verify the information processing constraints.
• When T 1 ď t:
1 .
• T 1 " 0 happen with zero probability. However, in this case ErT ě 1s. Therefore this goes back to case one. To sum up, we showed that:
E ru pA, X qs´mT´T fˆI pA; X | q T˙+ On the other hand the inequality of the other hand is straight foward, any strategy achieve the RHS can be achieved in origianl problem Equation (P). Therefore:
Finally, we consider solving optimal T in Equation (1). Fix I, consider:
T`T fˆI T˙İ
first show that the objective function is quasi-convex. mT is already linear, so it's sufficient to show quasi-convexity of T`I T˘. By transforming argument, it's not hard to see that it's equivalent to show quasi-convexity of f pIq I w.r.t. I. Now consider I 1 ă I 2 and λ P p0, 1q. Suppose by contradiction:
contradicting convexity of f pIq. Therefore, mT`T`I T˘i s quasi-convex in T. Since f is convex, it always has one-side derivatives well defined. So an necessary condition for T solving the problem will be:
What's more, since f is convex, the correspondence f pλq´λ f 1 pλq is increasing (in set order). Therefore, the set of λ such that m`f pλq λ P B f pλq must be an connected interval. Therefore, m`f pλq λ P B f pλq is actually also sufficient for minimizing mT`T f p I T q. Case 1.: tλ|m`f pλq P λB f pλqu ‰ H: Since f is convex, B f is a continuous correspondence, therefore the set is closed. Pick the smallest λ:
Therefore, the total cost paid can be summarized by:
Finally, the constraint T ě 1 can be replaced by:
Theorem 1 is proved. Case 2.: m`f pλq´λB f pλq ą 0 @λ. That is to say:
mT`T fˆI Ti s strictly increasing in T @I. Therefore, independent of choice I, choosing smaller T will yield higher utility. T will eventually be smaller than 1. So we can rule out this case. Case 3.: m`f pλq´λB f pλq ă 0 @λ. That is to say:
mT`T fˆI Ti s strictly decreasing in T @I. However this is not possible since:
To sum up, if tλ|m`f pλq P λB f pλqu " H, then we define λ " 8. Then the constraint for second term in Equation (B.3) can never be satisfied and Vpµq " sup a E rupa, X qs. 
Lemma 1 (Reduction of redundency
What's more, the optimal utility level is same in Equation (P) and Equation (B.4).
Proof. Suppose`S t , T , A t˘i s a feasible strategy to Equation (P). Let first show that it's WLOG that the DM can discard all information after taking an action: take given T and A t , take s 0 as a given degenerate signal, define p S t as:
By definition, p S t " S t conditional on T ě t`1. Therefore:
To show that the first information processing constraint is satisfied, we discuss the case p S " s 0 and p S ‰ s 0 separately:
which is independent of realization of X .
Then by law of total probability:
Prob´T ą tˇˇS t´1 , X"
hich is independent of realization of X . Therefore, we proved that:
Therefore´p S t , A t , T¯is feasible and :
First inequality is simply rewriting two possible cases of T . Second equality is from definition of r S t when T ą t`1. First inequality is from X Ñ p S t Ñ A t`1 conditional on T " t1 . Therefore,´r S t , T , A t¯d ominates the original solution in Equation (P) by achieving same action profile but lower costs.´r S t , T , A t¯i s a feasible solution to Equation (B.4). Therefore solving Equation (B.4) yields a weakly higher utility than Equation (P). What remains to be proved is that any´r S t , T , A t¯f easible in Equation (B.4) can be dominated by some strategy feasible in Equation (P). It's not hard to see that it's feasible in Equation (P). Finally we show that the two formulation gives same utility:
herefore, Equation (P) is equivalent to Equation (B.4).
B.2. Proof for Proposition 3
Proof. The outer maximization of Equation (1) 
The maximum is independent to i and strictly positive for any α. Therefore: 
B.3. Proof for Proposition 5
Proof. Existence: Equations (2) and (3) can be solved prior by prior. Therefore, I sometimes don't explicitly include prior any more in this proof. It's not hard see that it's sufficient to prove existence of solution to:
where A P ∆AˆX and f is convex. Equation (B.7) can be modified to accommodate Equation (2) by set f to be a linear function. This can be WLOG directly modeled in changing information measure I. Equation (B.7) is different from Equation (3) by only a constant. Therefore, it is sufficient to show existence of solution to Equation (B.7) under Assumption 1. Next let's explicitly model the set of all feasible A's: ∆AˆX P R p|A|´1qˆ|X| . Let's call this set Λ and any conditional distribution p pa|xq P Λ. We define r I : Λ Ñ R`: r I ppp¨|¨qq " I pγq where γ " pπ, µq P Γ and π is defined by distribution of posteriors induced by p:
Our original problem Equation (B.7) can be written as:
ppa|xqµpxqupa, xq´f´r IppqT o show existence of solution, it will be sufficient to show convexity of r I. If r I is convex, the objective function is continuous in p and the space Λ is compact (a closed and bounded set in Eclidean space). Now let's study convexity of r I. Consider @ p 1 , p 2 P Λ. Let p " λp 1`p 1´λqp 2 . It's not hard to verify that p P Λ as well. Want to show: On the other hand, p 1 can be written as combination of p 1 and p 2 . Let S 0 be randomly t1, 2u with probability λ 1 , λ 2 . Let pS 1 |1, µq " p 1 and pS 1 |2, µq " p 2 . Then it's easy to see that pS 0 , S 1 , µq " p 1 . Therefore:
r Ippq ď r Ipp 1 q "IpS 0 , S 1 ; X |µq ďIpS 0 ; X |µq`λ 1 I pS 1 |1; X |µq`λ 2 I pS 1 |2; X |µq "λ r Ipp 1 q`p1´λq r Ipp 2 q First inequality is from monotonicity, second inequality is from sub-additivity. Therefore r I is a convex (and continuous) function. It's easy to see that Λ is a compact set. So we can apply Wierestrass theorem to conclude existence of solution. Then by non-negativity of stochastic matrices, suppose M PP 1 ij ą 0, then M P 1 Pj are all 0 except M P 1 Pji . Then for all such rows j, we have M PP 1 j be a vector with only ith column being nonzero. However this suggests they are replicated rows. So the only possibility is that j s.t. M PP 1 ij ą 0 is unique. And
Since stochastic matrices have elements no larger than 1, it must be M PP 1 ij " M P 1 Pji " 1. This is equivalently saying P 1 j " P i . Since permutation of rows of P 1 doesn't affect our statement, let's assume P 1 i " P i afterwards for simplicity. So far we showed that if P i is not a positive combinations of P´i's, then P 1 i " P i . We do the folloing transformation: r P, r P 1 are P, P 1 removing ith row. Ă M PP 1 , Ă M P 1 P are M PP 1 , M P 1 P removing ith row and column. It's easy to verify that we still have:
and Ă M PP 1 , Ă M P 1 P still being stochastic matrices since previous argument shows M PP 1 ii and M P 1 Pii being the only non-zero element in their rows. Since they are both 1, they must also be only non-zero element in their columns. So removing them doesn't affect the matrices being stochatic matrices. Now we can repeat this process iteratively until any row r P i will be a positive combination of r P´i. If r P has one unique row, then the proof is done. We essentially showed that P " P 1 (up to permutation of rows). Therefore we only need to exclude the possibility of r P having more than one rows.
Suppose r P has n rows. Then r P 1 is a posistive combination of r P´i's: Since all rows in r P are non-negative (and strictly positive in some elements). This is possible only in two cases:
• Case 1. a 2 1 a 1 2 " 1 and ř ią2`a 2 i`a 2 1 a 1 i˘" 0. This implies r P 1 " a 1 2 r P 2 . Contradicting nonreplication.
• Case 2. a 2 1 a 1 2 ă 1. Then r P 2 is a positive combination of r P ią2 . Of course r P 1 is also a positive combination of r P ią2 .
Now by induction suppose r P 1 , . . . , r P i are positive combinations of r P jąi . Then: Similar to previous analysis, non-replication implies ř i j"1 a i`1 j ă 1 and r P i`1 is a positive combination of r P jąi`1 . Then by replacing r P i`1 in combination of all r P jďi , we can conclude that r P 1 , . . . , r P i`1 are all positive combinations of r P jąi`1 . Finally, by induction we have all r P iăn being positive combination of r P n . However, this contradicts non-replication. To sum up, we proved by contradiction that r P has one unique row. Therefore, P must be indentical to P 1 up to permutations.
